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Value of Cash Holdings and Accounting Conservatism


Henock Louis


Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business

Amy X. Sun


Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting

Oktay Urcan


London Business School

August 16, 2011

AAA 2010 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper

Abstract:     
We posit that accounting conservatism could mitigate the value destruction associated with increases in cash holdings. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the market value of an additional dollar in cash holdings increases in accounting conservatism. This result is robust to controlling for strength of corporate governance, earnings quality, past stock performance, potential unobserved firm heterogeneity, potential endogenous changes in conservatism, and other relevant variables. Overall, the evidence suggests that accounting conservatism is associated with a more efficient use of cash holdings, supporting the notion that accounting conservatism can serve as a substitute for external monitoring and reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

Keywords: Cash holdings, Accounting conservatism, Agency costs

JEL Classification: M41, G30, G32

working papers series


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Date posted: June 11, 2009 ; Last revised: August 25, 2011

Suggested Citation

Louis, Henock, Sun, Amy X. and Urcan, Oktay, Value of Cash Holdings and Accounting Conservatism (August 16, 2011). AAA 2010 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1415562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1415562

Contact Information

Henock Louis (Contact Author)
Pennsylvania State University - Smeal College of Business ( email )
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-865-4160 (Phone)
814-863-8393 (Fax)
Amy X. Sun
Pennsylvania State University - Department of Accounting ( email )
308 armsby
university park, PA 16802
United States
814-863-7071 (Phone)
814-863-8393 (Fax)
Oktay Urcan
London Business School ( email )
Sussex Place
Regent's Park
London, NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
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