Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416787
 
 

References (55)



 
 

Citations (6)



 


 



What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program


Meredith Fowlie


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Stephen P. Holland


University of California, Berkeley - Energy Institute; University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Bryan School of Business & Economics

Erin T. Mansur


Dartmouth College - Dartmouth Economics Department; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 9, 2009


Abstract:     
A perceived advantage of cap-and-trade programs over more prescriptive environmental regulation is that enhanced compliance flexibility and cost effectiveness can make more stringent emissions reductions politically feasible. However, increased compliance flexibility can also result in an inequitable distribution of pollution. We investigate these issues in the context of Southern California's RECLAIM program. We match facilities in RECLAIM with similar California facilities also located in non-attainment areas. Our results indicate that emissions fell approximately 24 percent, on average, at RECLAIM facilities relative to our counterfactual. Furthermore, we find that observed changes in emissions do not vary significantly with neighborhood demographic characteristics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

Keywords: environmental regulation, market based instruments, RECLAIM, environmental justice

JEL Classification: H23, Q52, D63, R20

working papers series


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Date posted: June 11, 2009 ; Last revised: February 21, 2014

Suggested Citation

Fowlie, Meredith and Holland, Stephen P. and Mansur, Erin T., What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to Whom? Evidence from Southern California's NOx Trading Program (June 9, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1416787 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1416787

Contact Information

Meredith Fowlie
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy ( email )
735 South State Street, Weill Hall
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Stephen P. Holland
University of California, Berkeley - Energy Institute ( email )
310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro - Bryan School of Business & Economics ( email )
401 Bryan Building
Greensboro, NC 27402-6179
United States
Erin T. Mansur (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Dartmouth Economics Department ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603 646 2531 (Phone)
603 646 2122 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.dartmouth.edu/~mansur/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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