Resources or Power? Implications of Social Networks on Compensation and Firm Performance
University of Exeter Business School
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Accounting Department
Harvard University - Harvard Business School
Journal of Business, Finance and Accounting, Vol. 39, Issue 3-4: 399-426.
Using a sample of 4,278 listed UK firms, we construct a social network of directorship-interlocks that comprises 31,495 directors. We use social capital theory and techniques developed in social network analysis to measure a director’s connectedness and investigate whether this connectedness is associated with their compensation level and their firms overall performance. We find connectedness is positively associated with compensation and with the firm’s future performance. The results do not support the view that executive and outside directors use their connections to rent extract. Rather the company compensates these individuals for the resources these better connections provide to the firm.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 46
Keywords: corporate governance, compensation, board of directors, social networks, performance
JEL Classification: G30, G32, J33, L22, M41
Date posted: June 12, 2009 ; Last revised: July 19, 2013
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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