Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory
University of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) - Department of Economics (DEP); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
University of California, Davis - Department of Economics
UC Davis Working Paper No. 98-14
We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.
JEL Classification: C72working papers series
Date posted: January 13, 1999
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