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Recent Results on Belief, Knowledge and the Epistemic Foundations of Game TheoryPierpaolo BattigalliUniversity of Bocconi - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research (IGIER) - Department of Economics (DEP); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) Giacomo BonannoUniversity of California, Davis - Department of Economics UC Davis Working Paper No. 98-14 Abstract: We provide a self-contained, selective overview of the literature on the role of knowledge and beliefs in game theory. We focus on recent results on the epistemic foundations of solution concepts, including correlated equilibrium, rationalizability in dynamic games, forward and backward induction.
JEL Classification: C72 working papers seriesDate posted: January 13, 1999Suggested CitationContact Information
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