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Academic Faculty Governance and Recruitment DecisionsJens PruferTilburg University - CentER; Tilburg University - Law and Economics Center (TILEC); Tilburg University - Department of Organization & Strategy Uwe WalzGoethe University Frankfurt - Institute of Economics September 13, 2011 CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2009-49 TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2009-021 Abstract: We analyze the implications of the governance structure in academic faculties for their recruitment decisions when competing for new researchers. The value to individual members through social interaction within the faculty depends on the average status of their fellow members. In recruitment decisions, incumbent members trade off the effect of entry on average faculty status against alternative uses of the recruitment budget if no entry takes place. We show that the best candidates join the best faculties but that they receive lower wages than some lesser ranking candidates. We also study the allocation of surplus created by the entry of a new faculty member and show that faculties with symmetric status distributions maximize their joint surplus under majority voting.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27 Keywords: Academic faculties, university governance, organizational design, status organizations JEL Classification: D02, D71, L22 working papers seriesDate posted: June 15, 2009 ; Last revised: September 27, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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