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Determinants and Effects of Corporate LobbyingMatthew D. HillUniversity of Mississippi - Department of Finance G. W. KellyMississippi State University - Department of Finance and Economics G. Brandon LockhartUniversity of Nebraska-Lincoln Robert A. Van NessUniversity of Mississippi - Department of Finance January 19, 2011 Abstract: This study examines the determinants and shareholder wealth effects of corporate lobbying. Descriptive and multivariate statistics indicate a substantial temporal increase in lobbying expenditures and the proportion of firms lobbying. We find that lobbying behavior is related to firm size, investment opportunities, cash flow, state and capital city incorporation, and industry and time effects. After controlling for factors known to influence firm value, results suggest lobbying firms significantly outperform non-lobbying firms. Further, excess returns are directly associated with the number of years that firms lobby, prior period investments in lobbying, and lobbying expenditures in excess of industry norms. Results are robust to self-selection bias.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 47 Keywords: Corporate Lobbying, Political Connections, Market Value working papers seriesDate posted: June 16, 2009 ; Last revised: January 23, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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