Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423724
 
 

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On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods


Felix J. Bierbrauer


Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

June 2009

MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/15

Abstract:     
The literature on public goods has shown that efficient outcomes are impossible if participation constraints have to be respected. This paper addresses the question whether they should be imposed. It asks under what conditions efficiency considerations justify that individuals are forced to pay for public goods that they do not value. It is shown that participation constraints are desirable if public goods are provided by a malevolent Leviathan. By contrast, with a Pigouvian planner, efficiency can be achieved. Finally, the paper studies the delegation of public goods provision to a pro t-maximizing rm. This also makes participation constraints desirable.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: Public goods, Mechanism Design, Incomplete Contracts, Regulation

JEL Classification: D02, D82, H41, L51

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Date posted: June 23, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Bierbrauer, Felix J., On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods (June 2009). MPI Collective Goods Preprint, No. 2009/15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1423724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1423724

Contact Information

Felix J. Bierbrauer (Contact Author)
Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )
Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany
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