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The Efficiency of Comparative Causation


Francesco Parisi


University of Minnesota - Law School; University of Bologna

Ram Singh


University of Delhi - Delhi School of Economics

July 1, 2009

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-28

Abstract:     
Comparative causation is the only tort regime that allows parties to share an accident loss in equilibrium. The sharing of an accident loss between a nonnegligent injurer and his nonnegligent victim spreads activity level and R&D incentives between prospective tortfeasors and their victims. This is an effect that is never observed under the other negligence and strict liability based regimes. In spite of these interesting attributes, the existing literature left open the question as to whether loss sharing was able to maintain optimal care incentives for both parties. In this paper, we address this unresolved issue in the literature, considering the effciency of loss-sharing under comparative causation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: torts, loss-sharing, negligence, strict liability, comparative causation

JEL Classification: K13, K32

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Date posted: July 6, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Parisi, Francesco and Singh, Ram, The Efficiency of Comparative Causation (July 1, 2009). Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-28. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1428410

Contact Information

Francesco Parisi (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota - Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
University of Bologna ( email )
Piazza Scaravilli 1
40126 Bologna, fc 47100
Italy
Ram Singh
University of Delhi - Delhi School of Economics ( email )
Delhi School of Economics
University of Delhi, North Campus
Delhi-110007, Delhi 110007
India
HOME PAGE: http://www.econdse.org/faculty/ram/ram.htm
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