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The Evolution of Aggregate Stock Ownership - A Unified Explanation

Kristian Rydqvist
SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Joshua D. Spizman
University of Central Florida - Department of Finance; SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management

Ilya A. Strebulaev
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business


July 1, 2009

ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 263/2009
Paris December 2009 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI

Abstract:     
Since World War II, direct stock ownership by households has largely been replaced by indirect stock ownership by financial institutions. We argue that tax policy is the driving force. Using long time-series from eight countries, we show that the fraction of household ownership decreases with measures of the tax benefits of holding stocks inside a pension plan. This finding is important for policy considerations on effective taxation and for financial economics research on the long-term effects of taxation on corporate finance and asset prices.

Keywords: Capital gains tax, income tax, stock ownership, inflation, bracket creep, pension funds

JEL Classifications: G10, G20, H22, H30

Working Paper Series

Date posted: July 02, 2009 ; Last revised: October 26, 2009

Suggested Citation

Rydqvist, Kristian, Spizman, Joshua D. and Strebulaev, Ilya A., The Evolution of Aggregate Stock Ownership - A Unified Explanation (July 1, 2009). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 263/2009; Paris December 2009 Finance International Meeting AFFI - EUROFIDAI. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1428442


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Contact Information

Kristian Rydqvist (Contact Author)
SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management ( email )
P.O. Box 6015
Binghamton, NY 13902-6015
United States
607-777-2673 (Phone)
607-777-4422 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels Belgium
Joshua D. Spizman
University of Central Florida - Department of Finance ( email )
Orlando, FL 32816-1400
United States
407-823-0896 (Phone)
SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management ( email )
School of Management
PO Box 6000
Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States
607-777-5199 (Phone)
Ilya A. Strebulaev
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )
518 Memorial Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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