Exclusive Dealing, Market Shares and the Safe Harbour of Regulation 2790/1999 - Time for a Rethink?
University of Liege
affiliation not provided to SSRN
March 1, 2009
IEJE Working Paper No. 5/2009
The present paper discusses whether the market share threshold enshrined in Regulation 2790/1999 allows to draw correct inferences on the foreclosure risks arising from single branding and exclusive purchasing obligations in the context of vertical relationships. As far as the customer foreclosure risks arising from single branding are concerned, it comes to the conclusion that Regulation 2790/1999 wrongly focuses on the market share of the seller and should concentrate on the market share of the acquirer. Symetrically, in so far as the input foreclosure risks arising from exclusive purchasing are concerned, Regulation 2790/1999 should focus on the market share of the seller. In the context of the upcoming review of the rules applicable to vertical agreements, the European Commission should seek to address this problem.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 19
Keywords: Vertical agreements, single branding, exclusive purchasing, markets share, threshold, Regulation 2790/1999, foreclosureworking papers series
Date posted: July 2, 2009
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