Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-Out Policies
Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); Goethe University Frankfurt - Department of Finance
University of Bonn - Economic Science Area; Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
University of Mainz - Faculty of Law and Economics; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
June 17, 2009
Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
European Business School Research Paper No. 09-13
This paper empirically investigates the effect of government bail-out policies on banks outside the safety net. We construct a measure of bail-out perceptions by using rating information. From there, we construct the market shares of insured competitor banks for any given bank, and analyze the impact of this variable on banks’ risk-taking behavior, using a large sample of banks from OECD countries. Our results suggest that government guarantees to some banks strongly increase the risk-taking of the competitor banks not protected by such guarantees. In contrast, there is no evidence that public guarantees increase the protected banks’ risk-taking. These results have important implications for the effects of the recent wave of bank bail-outs on banks’ risk-taking behavior.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42
Keywords: government bail-out, implicit and explicit government guarantees, banking competition, risk-taking
JEL Classification: G21, G28, L53working papers series
Date posted: July 8, 2009 ; Last revised: November 23, 2010
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