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The Welfare Effects of Liquidity Constraints


Tullio Jappelli


University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Center for Studies in Economics and Finance - CSEF

Marco Pagano


University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

December 1998

University of Salerno Working Paper No. 13

Abstract:     
We analyze the welfare implications of liquidity constraints for households in an overlapping generations model with growth. In a closed economy with exogenous technical progress, liquidity constraints reduce welfare if the economy is dynamically inefficient. But if it is dynamically efficient, some degree of financial repression is required to maximize steady-state utility, even though some generations are hurt in the transition. With endogenous technical progress, financial repression may increase welfare even along the transition path, thus leading to a Pareto improvement. In this case the optimal degree of financial repression increases as the economy grows.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

JEL Classification: E21, O16

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Date posted: May 19, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Jappelli, Tullio and Pagano, Marco, The Welfare Effects of Liquidity Constraints (December 1998). University of Salerno Working Paper No. 13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=143053 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.143053

Contact Information

Tullio Jappelli (Contact Author)
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/researchers/details/rschcontact.asp?IDENT=106354
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Center for Studies in Economics and Finance - CSEF
84084 Fisciano, Salerno
Italy
+39 089 963 165 (Phone)
+39 089 963 169 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.csef.it/people/jappelli.htm
Marco Pagano
University of Naples Federico II - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Cintia - Monte S. Angelo
Napoli, 80126
Italy
+39 081 675306 (Phone)
+39 081 7663540 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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