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Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on ItalyB. Espen EckboDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Giulia PaoneDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business Runa UrheimCentral Bank of Norway January 2011 Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2009-64 ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 174/2011 Abstract: Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report is one of a series examining the potential for increased harmonization of cross-border share-voting systems and proxy voting in the U.S. and Member States of the European Union (EU). The report describes the share-registration system and voting chain for publicly traded companies in Italy. We highlight voting impediments and examine recent regulatory attempt to make the voting process both more efficient and conforming to the 2007 EU Shareholder Rights Directive. We also provide some first empirical evidence on how Italian listed firms adapt to Italy's share-voting system in practice.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 188 Keywords: voting, voting chain, shareownership, shareholder rights, proxy voting, voting impediments JEL Classification: K22 working papers seriesDate posted: July 11, 2009 ; Last revised: February 18, 2011Suggested CitationContact Information
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