Efficiency of Share-Voting Systems: Report on Italy
B. Espen Eckbo
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business
Central Bank of Norway
Tuck School of Business Working Paper No. 2009-64
ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 174/2011
Institutional shareholders around the world increasingly use active share-voting to protect their portfolio investments and improve corporate governance. However, exercising voting rights involves costly and often arcane country-specific legal rules. This report is one of a series examining the potential for increased harmonization of cross-border share-voting systems and proxy voting in the U.S. and Member States of the European Union (EU). The report describes the share-registration system and voting chain for publicly traded companies in Italy. We highlight voting impediments and examine recent regulatory attempt to make the voting process both more efficient and conforming to the 2007 EU Shareholder Rights Directive. We also provide some first empirical evidence on how Italian listed firms adapt to Italy's share-voting system in practice.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 188
Keywords: voting, voting chain, shareownership, shareholder rights, proxy voting, voting impediments
JEL Classification: K22working papers series
Date posted: July 11, 2009 ; Last revised: February 18, 2011
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