Some Observations About the Standards Applied to Labor Injunction Litigation Under Sections 10 (j) and 10 (l) of the National Labor Relations Act
Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law
Indiana Law Journal, Vol. 59, pp. 565-581, 1984
Recently, I gave a lecture to a seminar of federal judges. In preparing the talk, I confirmed what I had suspected at first impression: the judiciary has reverted significantly, although not universally, to some practices of pre-Norris-LaGuardia days. In dealing with the NLRA's sections 10(l) and 10(j), the courts often practice two standards. As for section 10(l), which is aimed almost entirely at unions, federal courts are inclined virtually to rubber-stamp National Labor Relations Board requests for injunctions. However, in considering applications for section 10j) injunctions, which are primarily aimed at employers, the courts are inclined, especially when employers are the respondents, to be more critical of the Board's petition and, as a result, often deny or significantly qualify the requested relief. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted to prevent federal courts from interfering with union activities. Serving as a backdrop to sections 10 (1) and 10(), the Norris-LaGuardia Act suggests that, if there were to be a double standard, it would work in a manner opposite to the one that has evolved. The first two sections of this article briefly summarize the events leading to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and to the enactment of the two explicit exceptions in the National Labor Relations Act. Next, I attempt to set out and critique what the courts are doing. Finally, I urge standards which I think should be applied to both section 10(l) and section 10(0) cases.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 17
Keywords: National Labor Relations Act, labor injunction, Norris-LaGuardia ActAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 9, 2009
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