Market Size and Intellectual Property Protection
Washington University in Saint Louis
David K. Levine
Washington University in Saint Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)
International Economic Review, Vol. 50, Issue 3, pp. 855-881, August 2009
Intellectual property (IP) protection involves a trade-off between the undesirability of monopoly and the desirable encouragement of creation and innovation. Optimal policy depends on the relative strength of these two forces. We give a quantitative assessment of current IP policies. We focus particularly on the scale of the market, showing that as it increases, due either to growth or to the expansion of trade, IP protection should be reduced.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 27
Date posted: July 9, 2009
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