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Centros and the Cost of Branching


Marco Becht


Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Luca Enriques


Harvard Law School; LUISS Guido Carli University - Faculty of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Veronika Edit Korom


University of Economics and Business Administration

April 1, 2009

Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 9, Part 1, April 2009

Abstract:     
Following the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a thriving market for incorporations has developed in the European Union. Round-trip incorporation is competing with domestic incorporation. Entrepreneurs can set up a shell company in any EU jurisdiction and branch back to their home country to operate a business. The UK Limited Company (UK Limited) is a popular choice in many countries because it is rapidly and cheaply available online with minimum formalities. We have developed a taxonomy for measuring the cost of Limited round-trip incorporation. The cost of setting up a UK Limited is directly observable in the market while the cost of branching is not. We have run field experiments to measure the cost of branching. Our analysis reveals that despite the ECJ rulings, branching remains costly or impractical in many cases. Incorporation agents play an essential role in overcoming the limitations to branching.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: incorporation, costs of regulation, regulatory competition

JEL Classification: G38, K22

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: July 15, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco, Enriques, Luca and Korom, Veronika Edit, Centros and the Cost of Branching (April 1, 2009). Journal of Corporate Law Studies, Vol. 9, Part 1, April 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433311

Contact Information

Marco Becht (Contact Author)
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )
Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50
C.P. 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
+32 2 650 2149 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/~mbecht
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )
19 Av Franklin Roosevelt
1050
Brussels
Belgium
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Avenue des Statuaires 120
Brussels, 1180
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Luca Enriques
LUISS Guido Carli University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Italy
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http:/www.ecgi.org
Veronika Edit Korom
University of Economics and Business Administration ( email )
Augasse 2-6
Vienna, Wien A-1090
Austria
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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