Download This PaperCorporate Governance and Investor Reactions to Seasoned Equity Offerings
47 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2009 Last revised: 24 Jul 2009
Date Written: July 1, 2009
Abstract
We study the role of corporate governance in abnormal returns around announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) by publicly traded U. S. firms from 2001 - 2004. We find that investors react more positively for firms in which different people hold the CEO and board chairman positions. We also find limited evidence that investor reaction is more positive when the board has a greater representation of outside directors, the CEO has less ownership, and the board is not too large. Our findings suggest that investors react more favorably to SEOs by firms with stronger corporate governance mechanisms that reduce adverse selection or agency problems.
Keywords: SEO, Announcement Effect, Corporate Governance, CEO Power, CEO Duality, CEO Ownership, Board of Directors, Board Effectiveness, Board Independence
JEL Classification: G14, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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