An Evidence-Based Approach to Exclusive Dealing and Loyalty Discounts
Joshua D. Wright
Federal Trade Commission; George Mason University School of Law
July 15, 2009
Global Competition Policy, No. 1, July 2009
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-32
At the recent Section 2 hearings focused on the antitrust analysis of exclusive dealing contracts, a sensible consensus view emerged that a necessary condition for anticompetitive harm in an exclusive dealing or de facto exclusive contract is that the contract deprives rivals of the opportunity to compete. These contracts, including market-share discounts and “loyalty discounts,” can harm competition when they deprive rivals of an entrenched firm from accessing distribution sufficient to achieve a minimum efficient scale. The recently-withdrawn Section 2 Report reflects this consensus. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the Section 2 Report approach to exclusive dealing and loyalty discounts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 7
Keywords: antitrust, consumer, David Evans, entrant, entry, exclusion, free ride, Heide, monopolist, predation, retailers
JEL Classification: K21, L41, L42, L44Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: July 18, 2009
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