Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435806
 


 



The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox


Ken Levy


Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge - Paul M. Hebert Law Center

June 1, 2009

Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 47, pp. 131-58, 2009

Abstract:     
The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the 'Wright & Sudbury Argument,' and the 'Epistemic Blindspot Argument.' The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: surprise, paradox, rationality, knowledge, justified belief, certainty, intuition, backward induction, liar paradox, moore's paradox, logical circle, blindspot

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Date posted: July 18, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Levy, Ken, The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox (June 1, 2009). Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 47, pp. 131-58, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1435806

Contact Information

Ken Levy (Contact Author)
Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge - Paul M. Hebert Law Center ( email )
420 Law Center Building
Baton Rouge, LA 70803
United States
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