Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436154
 
 

Footnotes (81)



 


 



Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity


William M. Sage


University of Texas at Austin School of Law

David A. Hyman


University of Illinois College of Law

July 19, 2009

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 154
U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-013

Abstract:     
Amnesia is a common, important, but rarely noted side effect of antibiotics. Apart from medical historians, few recall the severe morbidity and mortality once associated with acute bacterial infection. However, decades of antibiotic overuse and misuse have compromised the long-term availability and efficacy of these life-saving therapies. If designed and implemented appropriately, regulation can reduce the risk of bacterial infection, reserve antibiotics for circumstances where they are necessary, and rationalize the use of the most powerful agents. Regulation of antibiotic resistance can be justified, and should be guided, by both efficiency and fairness. A range of regulatory options are available - some information-based, some incentive-based, some command-and-control - each of which has indications, strengths, and weaknesses. A desired set of regulatory strategies must then be matched with the appropriate legal and regulatory institutions. A renewed focus on regulatory and institutional design has significant potential to reduce antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections and increase the effective life of existing and new antibiotics.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Antibiotic, antimicrobial, resistance, regulatory theory, regulation

JEL Classification: I18, K32

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 22, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Sage, William M. and Hyman, David A., Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity (July 19, 2009). U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 154; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436154 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1436154

Contact Information

William Matthew Sage (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
David A. Hyman
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,336
Downloads: 234
Download Rank: 73,913
Footnotes:  81

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo4 in 0.251 seconds