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Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity

William M. Sage
University of Texas at Austin School of Law

David A. Hyman
University of Illinois - College of Law


July 19, 2009

U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 154
U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-013

Abstract:     
Amnesia is a common, important, but rarely noted side effect of antibiotics. Apart from medical historians, few recall the severe morbidity and mortality once associated with acute bacterial infection. However, decades of antibiotic overuse and misuse have compromised the long-term availability and efficacy of these life-saving therapies. If designed and implemented appropriately, regulation can reduce the risk of bacterial infection, reserve antibiotics for circumstances where they are necessary, and rationalize the use of the most powerful agents. Regulation of antibiotic resistance can be justified, and should be guided, by both efficiency and fairness. A range of regulatory options are available - some information-based, some incentive-based, some command-and-control - each of which has indications, strengths, and weaknesses. A desired set of regulatory strategies must then be matched with the appropriate legal and regulatory institutions. A renewed focus on regulatory and institutional design has significant potential to reduce antibiotic-resistant bacterial infections and increase the effective life of existing and new antibiotics.

Keywords: Antibiotic, antimicrobial, resistance, regulatory theory, regulation

JEL Classifications: I18, K32

Working Paper Series

Date posted: July 22, 2009 ; Last revised: September 10, 2009

Suggested Citation

Sage, William M. and Hyman, David A., Combating Antimicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity (July 19, 2009). U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 154; U Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE09-013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436154


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William Matthew Sage (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Austin School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
David A. Hyman
University of Illinois - College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
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