Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436481
 
 

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An Administrable and Efficient Legal Standard for Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist


Steven C. Salop


Georgetown University Law Center

July 19, 2009


Abstract:     
This paper formulates a rigorous rule of reason legal standard under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for refusals to deal and price squeezes undertaken by an unregulated, vertically integrated monopolist against actual or potential competitors. This rule of reason standard is administrable by the courts and the monopolist. It takes into account the direct effects on consumers, as well as the longer run effects on the innovation and investment incentives of both the monopolist and its would-be competitors. In this way, the legal standard protects consumers and the competitive process on which a successful market economy is based.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: antitrust, refusals to deal, sherman act

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Date posted: July 20, 2009 ; Last revised: July 29, 2009

Suggested Citation

Salop, Steven C., An Administrable and Efficient Legal Standard for Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist (July 19, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1436481 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1436481

Contact Information

Steven C. Salop (Contact Author)
Georgetown University Law Center ( email )
600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States
202-662-9095 (Phone)
202-662-9497 (Fax)
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