Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 477-496, 2010
17 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2009 Last revised: 26 Feb 2011
There are 2 versions of this paper
Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications
Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and Implications
Date Written: December 31, 2009
Abstract
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law went into effect on August 1, 2008. Even though enforcement authorities tend to build their capacity progressively, China has already seen three milestone case decisions in the past year: InBev/Anheuser-Busch, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, and Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite. In this article, we elaborate the background of each case and provide in-depth analysis of each decision. In particular, we explore the common characteristics of the cases, the economic theories on which the merger control authority has relied in its merger decisions, and the patterns regarding China’s merger policy.
Keywords: Merger Control, Market Definition, Competition Policy, China
JEL Classification: G34, L4, L5, K21
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation