Allocating the Burden of Social Proof: Shared Thresholds and Social Influence

Abstract:     
People often yield in the face of social opposition to their positions, and the the likelihood of social influence rises with the number of influence sources, but the proposed nature of that relationship varies across theories, situations, and research paradigms. I argue that people share some sense of where the “burden of (social) proof” lies in situations where opinions or choices are in conflict. This theory suggests a family of models sharing two key parameters, one corresponding to the location of the normative threshold and the other reflecting the clarity of that norm across (or within) people. The plausibility of the models is demonstrated using Monte Carlo and cellular automata simulations and by fitting the model to a variety of classic datasets in the conformity, group deliberation, and social diffusion literatures. I compare and contrast this account with previous threshold and non-threshold models of social influence. Because the models are closely related to discrete choice models in economics, political science, and sociology, they may facilitate greater integration between social psychology and more macro-level disciplines.

Keywords: norms, social influence, jury deliberation, conformity

JEL Classifications: C92, D71, K42

Working Paper Series