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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441903
 
 

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The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums


Ronen Avraham


University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Leemore S. Dafny


Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Max M. Schanzenbach


Northwestern University - School of Law

December 30, 2010

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, December 2010
CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 196

Abstract:     
We evaluate the effect of tort reform on employer-sponsored health insurance premiums by exploiting state-level variation in the timing of reforms. Using a dataset of healthplans representing over 10 million Americans annually between 1998 and 2006, we find that caps on non-economic damages, collateral source reform, and joint and several liability reform reduce premiums by 1 to 2 percent each. These reductions are concentrated in PPOs rather than HMOs, suggesting that can HMOs can reduce “defensive” healthcare costs even absent tort reform. The results are the first direct evidence that tort reform reduces healthcare costs in aggregate; prior research has focused on particular medical conditions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: health care reform, tort reform, insruance

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Date posted: August 2, 2009 ; Last revised: February 14, 2011

Suggested Citation

Avraham, Ronen and Dafny, Leemore S. and Schanzenbach, Max M., The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Premiums (December 30, 2010). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, December 2010; CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper; U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 196. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1441903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1441903

Contact Information

Ronen Avraham
University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
(512) 232-1357 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=ra22397

Leemore S. Dafny (Contact Author)
Northwestern University - Department of Management & Strategy ( email )
Kellogg School of Management
2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Max Matthew Schanzenbach
Northwestern University - School of Law ( email )
375 E. Chicago Ave
Unit 1505
Chicago, IL 60611
United States
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