Constraint on the Control Benefits of Brokerage: Evidence from U.S. Venture Capital Fundraising
Christopher I. Rider
Georgetown University, McDonough School of Business
August 1, 2009
This paper investigates how the control benefits of a broker’s structural position are constrained by the perceived quality of actors a broker may represent in an exchange. I propose that brokers prefer to represent high quality actors but also that the value an actor places on representation is inversely related to the actor’s perceived quality. This tension implies that neither the actors that value representation most nor the actors that brokers would most like to represent are most likely to be represented by a broker. I also propose that this quality constraint on the control benefits of brokerage is mitigated by the matching of reputable brokers with high quality actors. Empirical analyses of U.S. venture capital fundraising support the theory. The likelihood that a broker represents a firm’s venture fund first increases and then decreases with three different quality indicators: fund size, firm experience and firm status. Firms of greater perceived quality are also represented by more reputable brokers.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 57
Keywords: networks, brokerage, reputation, venture capital
JEL Classification: A14, G24, L20working papers series
Date posted: August 2, 2009
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