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Strategic Mechanisms, Functional Modeling and Experimental Design in Neurolaw


Oliver R. Goodenough


Vermont Law School; Harvard University - Berkman Center for Internet & Society

August 3, 2009

Vermont Law School Research Paper No. 10-15
CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper

Abstract:     
This paper has four goals. The first is to provide an overview of the emerging sub-discipline of “Neurolaw.” Incorporating the insights of neuroscience into legal analysis and policy-setting is a rapidly expanding enterprise.

The second goal is to focus on game theory and mechanism design, which provide useful analytic starting points for applying cognitive neuroscience in a social context. This leads to the third goal. This paper suggests that the formal structures of the mechanisms of sociality may be represented in the structures of the cognitive processes which implement them. I do not mean to suggest that there is a simple and direct homology between such mechanisms and any particular physical structures within the brain. It is widely recognized, however, that the brain is a computational device, and the brain processes which carry out a particular type of computation will necessarily reflect the requirements of the computation being made.

Finally, the paper suggests an application of this mechanism-based approach to a particular instance: understanding the nature of human moral commitment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Neurolaw; Neuroscience, Mechanism Design, Moral Sentiments, Law, Moral Commitment, Game Theory

JEL Classification: K00

working papers series


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Date posted: August 7, 2009 ; Last revised: October 6, 2009

Suggested Citation

Goodenough, Oliver R., Strategic Mechanisms, Functional Modeling and Experimental Design in Neurolaw (August 3, 2009). Vermont Law School Research Paper No. 10-15; CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1443564

Contact Information

Oliver R. Goodenough (Contact Author)
Vermont Law School ( email )
164 Chelsea Street
P.O. Box 96
South Royalton, VT 05068
United States
802 831 1231 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Our_Faculty/Faculty_Directory/Oliver_R_Goodenough.htm

Harvard University - Berkman Center for Internet & Society ( email )
Harvard University
23 Everett Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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