Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership
Patrick Bolton
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Chenggang Xu
University of Hong Kong
June 1998
Abstract:
It is widely accepted that only the protection of private property rights and competition by rival firms provide adequate incentives to perform for managers and employees. However, it is not entirely clear how ownership interacts with competition. This paper centres around the question of ownership of firms and managerial competition and how these affect managers and employees' incentives to invest in human capital.
JEL Classification: G31, G32
working papers series
Suggested Citation
Bolton, Patrick and Xu, Chenggang, Ownership and Managerial Competition: Employee, Customer, or Outside Ownership (June 1998). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=144369
