Risk and CEO Turnover
Robert M. Bushman
University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School
University of Texas at Dallas - School of Management
Ohio State University - Fisher College of Business
August 1, 2009
This paper investigates how performance risk impacts a board’s ability to learn about a CEO’s unknown talent. We theorize that the information content of performance is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk, and that turnover-performance-sensitivity is also increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk. We further investigate relations between the threat of termination and CEO compensation, documenting that for retained CEOs, both subsequent pay-performance-sensitivity and pay levels decrease in the probability of turnover.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: CEO turnover, Idiosyncratic risk, systematic riskworking papers series
Date posted: August 7, 2009
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.680 seconds