The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals
J. W. Verret
George Mason University School of Law
August 6, 2009
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-37
This written testimony accompanied Professor J.W. Verret's oral testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development. This testimony argues that corporate governance reforms under consideration in the Senate, including the Shareholder Bill of Rights, will work to limit shareholder choice in corporate elections and risk undermining the role of states in corporate governance.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Keywords: corporate law, executive compensation, Delaware, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, mark-to-market accounting, Proxy Access, SEC, TARP, Wall Street
JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38working papers series
Date posted: August 6, 2009
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