Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444858
 
 

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The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals


J. W. Verret


Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University

August 6, 2009

George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-37

Abstract:     
This written testimony accompanied Professor J.W. Verret's oral testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Development. This testimony argues that corporate governance reforms under consideration in the Senate, including the Shareholder Bill of Rights, will work to limit shareholder choice in corporate elections and risk undermining the role of states in corporate governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: corporate law, executive compensation, Delaware, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, mark-to-market accounting, Proxy Access, SEC, TARP, Wall Street

JEL Classification: G30, G34, G38


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Date posted: August 6, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Verret, J. W., The Misdirection of Current Corporate Governance Proposals (August 6, 2009). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-37. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444858 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1444858

Contact Information

J. W. Verret (Contact Author)
Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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