Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444983
 


 



Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports Leagues and Private Punishment


Janine Young Kim


Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law

Matthew J. Parlow


Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law

August 6, 2009

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 99, No. 3, 2009
Marquette Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 09-29

Abstract:     
This Essay examines how professional sports leagues address (apparently increasing) criminal activity by players off of the field or court. It analyzes the power of professional sports leagues and, in particular, the commissioners of those leagues, to discipline wayward athletes. Such discipline is often met with great controversy - from players’ unions and commentators alike - especially when a commissioner invokes the “in the best interest of the sport” clause of the professional sports league’s constitution and bylaws. The Essay then contextualizes such league discipline in criminal punishment theory - juxtaposing punishment norms in public law with incentives and rationales for discipline in professional sports - and analyzes the legal and cultural limitations to this approach.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 26

Keywords: professional sports, criminal, leagues, athletes, punishment theory

JEL Classification: K14, K19, K29, K42


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Date posted: August 8, 2009 ; Last revised: January 13, 2015

Suggested Citation

Kim, Janine Young and Parlow, Matthew J., Off-Court Misbehavior: Sports Leagues and Private Punishment (August 6, 2009). Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 99, No. 3, 2009; Marquette Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 09-29. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444983

Contact Information

Janine Young Kim
Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law ( email )
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States

Matthew J. Parlow (Contact Author)
Chapman University, The Dale E. Fowler School of Law ( email )
One University Drive
Orange, CA 92866-1099
United States
714.628.2649 (Phone)

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