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You'd Better Be Committed: Legal Norms and Normativity

Sylvie Delacroix

University College London - Faculty of Laws

August 7, 2009

American Journal of Jurisprudence

There are many ways in which one may come to be committed to something. Commitment can be the result of an act of will; it can also be the culmination of some underlying disposition/sensibility. Part of the challenge in articulating our commitment to morality consists in understanding the interaction between its passive (we are all committed to morality just in virtue of being human) and its active (if it is to engage our responsibility, there has to be room for choice) dimensions.

In this paper, I seek to understand the role that this notion of commitment has to play in our understanding of both moral and legal normativity, as well as its link with the wider issue of "response-dependence" (an issue which Gardner's own definition of norm as "a kind of reason inescapably engaging the attention of any rational being without further ado" conveniently sets aside).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: normativity, responsibility, commitment, existentialism, realism, Gardner, response-dependence

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Date posted: August 10, 2009 ; Last revised: February 14, 2012

Suggested Citation

Delacroix, Sylvie, You'd Better Be Committed: Legal Norms and Normativity (August 7, 2009). American Journal of Jurisprudence. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1445455 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1445455

Contact Information

Sylvie Delacroix (Contact Author)
University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
HOME PAGE: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/index.shtml?delacroix
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