Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446680
 
 

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Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement?


Wilhelm Kohler


University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Gabriel J. Felbermayr


University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim

February 1, 2009


Abstract:     
We argue that compensating losers is more difficult for immigration than for trade and capital movements. While a tax-cum-subsidy mechanism allows the government to turn the gains from trade into a Pareto improvement, the same is not true for the so-called immigration surplus, if the redistributive mechanism is not allowed to discriminate against migrants. We discuss policy conclusions to be drawn from this fundamental asymmetry between migration and other forms of globalization.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 25

Keywords: Migration Surplus, Redistribution, Pareto Improvement

JEL Classification: F22, H21

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Date posted: August 12, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Kohler, Wilhelm and Felbermayr, Gabriel J., Can International Migration Ever Be Made a Pareto Improvement? (February 1, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446680 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1446680

Contact Information

Wilhelm K. Kohler (Contact Author)
University of Tuebingen - Department of Economics ( email )
Mohlstrasse 36
D-72074 Tuebingen, 72074
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Gabriel J. Felbermayr
University of Stuttgart-Hohenheim ( email )
Keplerstraße 17
D-70174 Stuttgart
Germany
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