Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448917
 


 



Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes and Clientelism


Adi Brender


Bank of Israel - Research Department

Allan Drazen


University of Maryland - Department of Economics; Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

May 1, 2009

American Economic Review, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 304-9, 2009

Abstract:     
In many democratic countries, especially those in which democracy is new, democracy is fragile and not fully consolidated, meaning that crucial political groups lack full commitment to the democratic process. The survival of democracy cannot be taken for granted. There are now a number of models that consider how economic policy should be used to address fragility of democracy. They focus on the importance of different groups and hence come up with different policy recommendations. We present a model that can encompass these differing views allowing us to compare them and link these models to theoretical and empirical work on clientelism.

Keywords: clientelism, new democracy, Democratic consolidation, elites, masses

JEL Classification: D72, H3, P16

Accepted Paper Series





Not Available For Download

Date posted: August 17, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Brender, Adi and Drazen, Allan, Consolidation of New Democracy, Mass Attitudes and Clientelism (May 1, 2009). American Economic Review, Vol. 99, No. 2, pp. 304-9, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448917

Contact Information

Adi Brender (Contact Author)
Bank of Israel - Research Department ( email )
PO Box 780
Jerusalem 91007
Israel
+972 2 655 2618 (Phone)
+972 2 655 2657 (Fax)
Allan Drazen
University of Maryland - Department of Economics ( email )
College Park, MD 20742-1815
United States
301-405-3477 (Phone)
301-405-7835 (Fax)
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 640 9488 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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