Delaying the Buck: Timing, Uncertainty, and Appropriations Outcomes
University of California, Santa Barbara
University of Pittsburgh
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
How do the dynamics of executive-legislative bargaining affect policy outcomes? This project examines the relationship between the duration of the appropriations process and budgetary outcomes in order to assess the relative importance of congressional actors and the sources of tension between them. We analyze whether longer delays at various stages of the process result in greater concessions to the president or to greater volatility in outcomes. We find that delay is associated with greater concessions to the president, but not with volatility, suggesting that the uncertainty in bargaining is uncertainty regarding the president’s position. We also find that the House concedes more to presidents who prefer less spending and that the Senate is more responsive to presidential needs during presidential election years.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22working papers series
Date posted: August 13, 2009 ; Last revised: April 17, 2012
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