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Theorizing the Role of the European Commission in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Hylke Dijkstra
Maastricht University - Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences



UACES Conference in Angers, France, September 3-5, 2009

Abstract:     
This article analyses why the EU member states have delegated tasks to the European Commission in the sensitive fields of foreign and security policy. While various publications give a descriptive account of the role of the Commission in foreign policy, few relate such observations to European integration theory. This article outlines competing rationalist and constructivist explanations for delegation and it subsequently studies the rationale of member states during the most important historical instances of (non-)delegation. From these findings, it concludes that member states delegated particular tasks to the Commission out of a functional need to bridge the divide between between economic integration and foreign policy coordination. There was a clear need for consistency and the European Commission was, due to its expertise of the internal market and knowledge of the acquis communautaire, best placed to provide it. As a result, the Commission is particularly active in the so-called cross-pillar dossiers.

Keywords: European Union, European Commission, foreign policy, CFSP, consistency

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: August 16, 2009 ; Last revised: August 16, 2009

Suggested Citation

Dijkstra, Hylke, Theorizing the Role of the European Commission in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (September 5, 2009). UACES Conference in Angers, France, September 3-5, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452726


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Contact Information

Hylke Dijkstra (Contact Author)
Maastricht University - Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences ( email )
Department of Political Science
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht 6200MD
Netherlands
HOME PAGE: http://www.fdcw.unimaas.nl/staff/dijkstra
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