Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452761
 
 

Citations (1)



 
 

Footnotes (1)



 


 



Is 'Say on Pay' Justified?


Stephen M. Bainbridge


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

2009

Regulation, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 42-47, Spring 2009
UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-19

Abstract:     
There is growing political support for adopting a 'Say on Pay' requirement for executive compensation - that is, shareholders must sign off on executive compensation. This paper examines three premises fundamental to the 'Say on Pay; movement: that current executive compensation is unjustifiably high, that federal legislation is required to address that high compensation, and that federal legislation would be effective in this aim. The paper finds that all three claims are problematic.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: federalism, say on pay, h.r. 1257, executive compensation, corporate governance, principal-agent dilemma, director primacy, shareholder activism

JEL Classification: D60, D70, G30, G34, G38, J33, L10, L21, M10

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: August 15, 2009 ; Last revised: September 22, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bainbridge, Stephen M., Is 'Say on Pay' Justified? (2009). Regulation, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 42-47, Spring 2009 ; UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-19. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452761

Contact Information

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-206-1599 (Phone)
310-825-6023 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 3,812
Downloads: 909
Download Rank: 12,783
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.281 seconds