Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458794
 
 

Citations



 


 



Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?


Russell B. Korobkin


UCLA School of Law


American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 162-208, 2009

Abstract:     
When lawsuits are resolved out of court, what determines the settlement price? This article uses a laboratory simulation and path analysis to estimate the relative importance of measurable variables in determining who wins the battle for the cooperative surplus. In the simulated negotiation conditions, seven variables explained more than half of the variation in settlement outcomes achieved by participants, with negotiators’ predictions of their opponent's reservation prices the most important, followed by negotiator gender and amount of first offer. Although the specific context of this article is settlement, the insights generated are applicable to any two-party, distributive negotiation.

JEL Classification: C78, C92, D03, D74, D86, K12, K41

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: August 25, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Korobkin, Russell B., Who Wins in Settlement Negotiations?. American Law and Economics Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 162-208, 2009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458794 or http://dx.doi.org/ahp004

Contact Information

Russell B. Korobkin (Contact Author)
UCLA School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-825-1994 (Phone)
310-206-7010 (Fax)
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