SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive

Einer Elhauge
Harvard University - Harvard Law School


September 2, 2009

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 646
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-45

Abstract:     
Although the Google Books Settlement has been criticized as anticompetitive, I conclude that this critique is mistaken. For out-of copyright books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by clarifying which books are in the public domain and making them digitally available for free. For claimed in-copyright books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by clarifying who holds their rights, making them digitally searchable, allowing individual digital display and sales at competitive prices each rightsholder can set, and creating a new subscription product that provides digital access to a near-universal library at free or competitive rates. For unclaimed incopyright books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by helping to identify rightsholders and making their books saleable at competitive rates when they cannot be found. The settlement does not raise rival barriers to offering any of these books, but to the contrary lowers them. The output expansion is particularly dramatic for out-of-print books, for which there is currently no new output at all.

Keywords: Google, books, Google Books, Google Books Settlement, copyright, digital books, cartel, monopoly, monopolization, orphan books, out-of-copyright, out-of-print, entry barriers, restraints of trade, Internet, antitrust

JEL Classifications: K21, L12, L4, L41, L42, L49

Working Paper Series

Date posted: August 23, 2009 ; Last revised: October 19, 2009

Suggested Citation

Elhauge, Einer R., Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive (September 2, 2009). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 646; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-45. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459028


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Einer R. Elhauge (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,002
Downloads: 314
Download Rank: 26,184
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.156 seconds.