Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459028
 
 

References (45)



 


 



Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive


Einer Elhauge


Harvard Law School

May 20, 2010

The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 1-68, 2010

Abstract:     
Although the Google Books Settlement has been criticized as anticompetitive, I conclude that this critique is mistaken. For out-of-copyright books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by clarifying which books are in the public domain and making them digitally available for free. For claimed in-copyright books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by clarifying who holds their rights, making them digitally searchable, allowing individual digital display and sales at competitive prices each rightsholder can set, and creating a new subscription product that provides digital access to a near-universal library at free or competitive rates. For unclaimed in-copyright books, the settlement procompetitively expands output by helping to identify rightsholders and making their books saleable at competitive rates when they cannot be found. The settlement does not raise rival barriers to offering any of these books, but to the contrary lowers them. The output expansion is particularly dramatic for commercially unavailable books, which by definition would otherwise have no new output.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 69

Keywords: Google, books, Google Books, Google Books Settlement, copyright, digital books, cartel, monopoly, monopolization, orphan books, out-of-copyright, out-of-print, entry barriers, restraints of trade, Internet, antitrust

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L4, L41, L42, L49

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: January 4, 2010 ; Last revised: October 27, 2012

Suggested Citation

Elhauge, Einer, Why the Google Books Settlement is Procompetitive (May 20, 2010). The Journal of Legal Analysis, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 1-68, 2010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459028 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1459028

Contact Information

Einer R. Elhauge (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 7,093
Downloads: 1,010
Download Rank: 11,237
References:  45
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.266 seconds