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Government Interference and the Efficiency of the Land Market in China


Liang Peng


University of Colorado at Boulder

Thomas G. Thibodeau


University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business

August 21, 2009


Abstract:     
Municipal governments in China established direct control of the supply of urban land in August 2004. This paper examines whether this government action mitigates the efficiency of the residential land market. Using a unique data set of detailed land and residential community transactions with manually collected location information for residential land lots in seven Chinese cities, we analyze the relationship between the land lease prices and residential property prices from the first quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2005. We find that residential property prices determine residential land prices prior to 2004:3, but have no influence after 2004:3. This supports the hypothesis that the market for residential land became less efficient after local Chinese governments initiated direct control of the land supply, in the sense that land transaction prices no longer reflect the demand for land.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 27

Keywords: land market, government interference, market efficiency

JEL Classification: R14, R53

working papers series


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Date posted: August 23, 2009 ; Last revised: March 15, 2010

Suggested Citation

Peng , Liang and Thibodeau, Thomas G., Government Interference and the Efficiency of the Land Market in China (August 21, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1459084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1459084

Contact Information

Liang Peng (Contact Author)
University of Colorado at Boulder ( email )
419 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309-419
United States
303-492-8215 (Phone)
303-492-5962 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/pengl/
Thomas G. Thibodeau
University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business ( email )
Boulder, CO 80309-0419
United States
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