Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460763
 
 

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Why do Countries Adopt International Financial Reporting Standards?


Karthik Ramanna


Harvard University - Harvard Business School

Ewa Sletten


Boston College

March 24, 2009

Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 09-102

Abstract:     
In a sample of 102 non-European Union countries, we study variations in the decision to adopt International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). There is evidence that more powerful countries are less likely to adopt IFRS, consistent with more powerful countries being less willing to surrender standard-setting authority to an international body. There is also evidence that the likelihood of IFRS adoption at first increases and then decreases in the quality of countries’ domestic governance institutions, consistent with IFRS being adopted when governments are capable of timely decision making and when the opportunity and switching cost of domestic standards are relatively low. We do not find evidence that levels of and expected changes in foreign trade and investment flows in a country affect its adoption decision: thus, we cannot confirm that IFRS lowers information costs in more globalized economies. Consistent with the presence of network effects in IFRS adoption, we find that a country is more likely to adopt IFRS if its trade partners or countries within in its geographical region are IFRS adopters.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: IFRS, international accounting, harmonization

JEL Classification: F42, G14, G15

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Date posted: August 25, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Ramanna, Karthik and Sletten, Ewa, Why do Countries Adopt International Financial Reporting Standards? (March 24, 2009). Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 09-102. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460763 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1460763

Contact Information

Karthik Ramanna
Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )
Morgan 389
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.hbs.edu/kramanna
Ewa Sletten (Contact Author)
Boston College ( email )
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
6175526584 (Phone)
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