Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149
 
 

References (16)



 
 

Citations (235)



 
 

Footnotes (21)



 


 



Eclipse of the Public Corporation


Michael C. Jensen


Harvard Business School; Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc.; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)


HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Sept.-Oct. 1989), revised 1997.

Abstract:     
The publicly held corporation has outlived its usefulness in many sectors of the economy. New organizations are emerging. Takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and other going-private transactions are manifestations of this change. A central source of waste in the public corporation is the conflict between owners and managers over free cash flow. This conflict helps explain the prominent role of debt in the new organizations. The new organizations' resolution of the conflict explains how they can motivate people and manage resources more effectively than public corporations. (HBR McKinsey Award Winner)

Number of Pages in PDF File: 31

Keywords: Governance, Agency, Control, Organizational Innovation, Going Private, Control Function of Debt, LBO Associations

JEL Classification: G32, G34

working papers series


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Date posted: May 3, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Jensen, Michael C., Eclipse of the Public Corporation. HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Sept.-Oct. 1989), revised 1997.. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146149

Contact Information

Michael C. Jensen (Contact Author)
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field
Negotiations, Organizations & Markets
Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-510-3363 (Phone)
305-675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=6484
Social Science Electronic Publishing (SSEP), Inc. ( email )
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United States
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305 675-3166 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://ssrn.com/author=9

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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References:  16
Citations:  235
Footnotes:  21

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