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Intracompany Governance and Innovation


Sharon Belenzon


Duke University; NBER

Tomer Berkovitz


Columbia Business School

Patrick Bolton


Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

August 2009

NBER Working Paper No. w15304

Abstract:     
This paper examines the relation between ownership, corporate form, and innovation for a cross-section of private and publicly traded innovating firms in the US and 15 European countries. A striking novel observation emerges from our analysis: while most innovating firms in the US are publicly traded conglomerates, a substantial fraction of innovation is concentrated in private firms and in business groups in continental European countries. We find virtually no variation across US industries in the corporate form of innovating firms, but a substantial variation across industries in continental European countries, where business groups tend to be concentrated in industries with a slower and more fundamental innovation cycle and where intellectual protection of innovators seems to be of paramount importance. Our findings suggest that innovative companies choose the corporate form most conducive to R&D, as predicted by the Coasian view of how firms form. This is especially true in Europe, where there are fewer regulatory hurdles to the formation of business groups and hybrid corporate forms. It is less the case in the US, where conglomerates are generally favored.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 88

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Date posted: August 31, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Belenzon, Sharon, Berkovitz, Tomer and Bolton, Patrick, Intracompany Governance and Innovation (August 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w15304. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1463897

Contact Information

Sharon Belenzon (Contact Author)
Duke University
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States
NBER ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(1) 617 588 1484 (Phone)
Tomer Berkovitz
Columbia Business School ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
Patrick Bolton
Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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