SSRN Home Search and Download Papers Browse Abstract and Paper Submission Subscribe to Networks View Briefcase Top Papers Top Authors Top Institutions

 

Abstract

 


 


Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase | Buy Hard Copy

The Uneasy Case for Product Liability

A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Steven Shavell
Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)



Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 381
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 647
Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-46

Abstract:     
We explain in this Article that the benefits of product liability may well be outweighed by its costs in a wide range of circumstances. One benefit is that the threat of liability may induce firms to improve product safety. However, this benefit is limited: even in the absence of product liability, firms would often be motivated by market forces to enhance product safety because their sales are likely to fall if their products harm consumers; moreover, their products must frequently conform to safety regulations. Consequently, product liability might not be expected to exert a significant additional influence on product safety - and the available empirical evidence suggests that such liability does not in fact have a measurable effect on the frequency of product accidents. A second benefit of product liability is that it causes product prices to increase to reflect the riskiness of products and thereby may improve consumer purchase decisions. But this benefit also involves a detriment, because product prices may rise excessively and undesirably chill purchases. A third benefit of product liability is that it compensates victims of product-related accidents for their losses. Yet this benefit is only partial, for accident victims are already often compensated by their insurers for some or all of their losses. Potentially offsetting the benefits of product liability are its costs, which are great. To transfer a dollar to a victim of a product accident requires more than a dollar on average in legal expenses. Given the limited benefits and the high costs of product liability, we conclude that it may be socially undesirable - especially for widely sold products, with respect to which market forces and regulation are relatively strong. This judgment is in tension both with the broad social endorsement of product liability and with proposals for its reform, which generally do not question its existence. Our more critical assessment of product liability stems from the fact that we engage in an analysis of its benefits and costs, whereas neither the proponents of product liability nor its reformers undertake to do so.

JEL Classifications: K13

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: September 07, 2009 ; Last revised: October 19, 2009

Suggested Citation

Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Shavell, Steven, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability (September 4, 2009). Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 381; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 647; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-46. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1468562


Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Steven Shavell (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
1575 Massachusetts
Hauser 406
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3668 (Phone)
617-496-2256 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
A. Mitchell Polinsky
Stanford Law School ( email )
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States
650-723-0886 (Phone)
650-723-3557 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 682
Downloads: 257
Download Rank: 32,765

© 2009 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use  Privacy Policy
This page was served by apollo3 in 0.125 seconds.