Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information? Evidence from Syndicated Lending and Short-selling
York University - Schulich School of Business
Debarshi K. Nandy
Brandeis University - International Business School
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business
NYU Working Paper No. FIN-09-006
This paper investigates important contemporary issues relating to hedge fund involvement in the syndicated loan market. In particular, we investigate the potential conflicts of interest that arise due to the lack of regulation relating to hedge funds permissible dual holding of loans and shortpositions in the equity of borrowing firms. We find evidence of possible trading on private information in the equity of the hedge fund borrowers prior to the public announcements of both loan origination and loan renegotiation (amendments). In addition, our results show that hedgefunds are more likely to lend to highly leveraged, low credit quality firms in comparison to bank lenders. Our results have important implications for the current debate regarding regulation of the hedge fund industry.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 63working papers series
Date posted: September 8, 2009
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