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Knights of the Court: The State Coalition Behind the International Criminal Court

L. Rush Atkinson V
New York University - School of Law



St. Thomas Law Review, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In its first years of operation, both the caseload and global role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have steadily increased. The Court owes much of its success to a coalition of states that has championed a strong, independent judiciary to try heinous international crimes. These states have repeatedly clashed with the United States over a number of issues involving the ICC’s jurisdiction. This article examines the pro-ICC coalition and its strategies during these disputes. It argues that the coalition’s success stems from the make-up of its membership, which endows it with varied sources of power and tempers its principled positions with an understanding of the political realities of the international order. The ICC coalition also serves as a case study of the power politics behind the formation of international law. While international law continues to be forged under the forces of realpolitik, this coalition’s success indicates that power-forged international law does not have to be the handmaiden of the most powerful states.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: September 09, 2009 ; Last revised: September 10, 2009

Suggested Citation

Atkinson, L. Rush, Knights of the Court: The State Coalition Behind the International Criminal Court (September 7, 2009). St. Thomas Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1469694


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Lawrence Rush Atkinson V (Contact Author)
New York University - School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
202.415.7683 (Phone)
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