Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands

Jeffrie G. Murphy

Arizona State University College of Law


Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987

James Rachels has argued that a morally autonomous person (in Kant’s sense) could not consistently accept the authority of divine commands. Against Rachels, this essay argues (a) that the Kantian concept of moral autonomy is to be analyzed in terms of an agent’s responsiveness to the best available moral reasons and (b) that it is simply question-begging against divine command theory to assume that such commands could not count as the best moral reasons available to an agent.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 6

Keywords: James Rachels, Immanuel Kant, Divine Command Theory

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Date posted: September 9, 2009  

Suggested Citation

Murphy, Jeffrie G., Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands (1987). Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1469701

Contact Information

Jeffrie G. Murphy (Contact Author)
Arizona State University College of Law ( email )
Box 877906
Tempe, AZ 85287-7906
United States
(480) 965-5856 (Phone)
(480) 965-2427 (Fax)
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