Kantian Autonomy and Divine Commands
Jeffrie G. Murphy
Arizona State University College of Law
Faith & Philosophy, Vol. 4, p. 276, 1987
James Rachels has argued that a morally autonomous person (in Kant’s sense) could not consistently accept the authority of divine commands. Against Rachels, this essay argues (a) that the Kantian concept of moral autonomy is to be analyzed in terms of an agent’s responsiveness to the best available moral reasons and (b) that it is simply question-begging against divine command theory to assume that such commands could not count as the best moral reasons available to an agent.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 6
Keywords: James Rachels, Immanuel Kant, Divine Command TheoryAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 9, 2009
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