Justifying Departures from Equal Treatment
Jeffrie G. Murphy
Arizona State University College of Law
March 1, 1984
The Journal of.Philosophy, Vol. 81, p. 587, 1984
This article considers the fundamental axiom that we should treat like cases alike. While many theories justify this assertion, this article considers when, and more importantly why, a society would be justified in not treating like cases alike. It notes that under current Supreme Court doctrine, alleged violations of this equal protection principle are reviewed under rational basis test with minimal scrutiny applied to lower court decisions. Yet, some cases, when a fundamental right is allegedly denied, invoke the strict scrutiny standard. In those cases, government action is only permitted if there is a compelling state interest. This article lays the groundwork for discussing what could be a compelling state interest.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 7
Keywords: Constitutional Law, Compelling State Interest, Treat Like Case AlikeAccepted Paper Series
Date posted: September 9, 2009
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