Abstract

  
 

References (5)



 


 



Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction


Wei Ding


University of Bonn - The Bonn Graduate School of Economics

Thomas D. Jeitschko


Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Elmar Wolfstetter


Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; World Bank
April 7, 2009


Abstract:     
In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 7

Keywords: Auctions, Signaling, Price Competition

JEL Classification: D44, D02, D43

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: September 9, 2009 ; Last revised: June 21, 2012

Suggested Citation

Ding, Wei, Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Wolfstetter, Elmar G., Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction (April 7, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1469745 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1469745

Contact Information

Wei Ding
University of Bonn - The Bonn Graduate School of Economics ( email )
Adenauerallee 24-26
Bonn, D-53113
Germany
Thomas D. Jeitschko
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/
Elmar G. Wolfstetter (Contact Author)
Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )
Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea
World Bank ( email )
1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-5426 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 615
Downloads: 287
Download Rank: 51,299
References:  5
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.500 seconds