An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions
George S. Geis
University of Virginia School of Law
September 11, 2009
Virginia Law Review, Forthcoming
Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2009-08
Despite the widespread media focus on business outsourcing transactions, we only have a limited understanding of how firms actually select a contractual framework to govern these complex relationships. This article analyzes a sample of onshore and offshore outsourcing contracts to pursue the topic. I first conduct a positive examination of the key features in 60 outsourcing transactions and find that firms employ a diverse array of terms to mitigate agency and hold-up problems. This work then provides the foundation for a second empirical inquiry - analyzing why specific relationships take on their observed forms. Using the micro-analytical dataset to explore links between transactional context and governance structure, I find some evidence that more hierarchical contracting is used when outsourcing contracts manage functions with higher appropriability risk. This analysis therefore provides moderate support for extending transaction cost theories of the firm into hybrid organizational contracting.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 53
Keywords: business outsourcing, empirical analysis, organizational contracting, theory of the firm
Date posted: September 20, 2009 ; Last revised: October 9, 2009
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 2.453 seconds