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Enablers of Exuberance: Legal Acts and Omissions that Facilitated the Global Financial Crisis


Jennifer Taub


Vermont Law School

September 4, 2009


Abstract:     
Note that this paper is an early discussion draft and is under substantial revision for a book project. Please consult author before referencing.

This paper explores certain legal acts and omissions that facilitated the over-leveraging and near collapse of the global financial system. These “Legal Enablers” fostered the boom that enriched a class of financial intermediaries who followed a storied tradition of gambling away “other people’s money.” These mechanisms also made the pain of the bust disproportionately felt by the middle class and poor while shielding the middlemen who created the problems. These Legal Enablers permitted the growth of a shadow banking system, without investment limits, transparency or government oversight. In the shadows grew a variety of highly leveraged private investment pools, undercapitalized conduits of securitized loans and speculation in complex credit derivatives. The rationale for allowing this unregulated, parallel system was that it helped to create innovation and provide liquidity. The conventional wisdom was that any risks associated with a hands-off approach could be managed by the “invisible hand” of the market. In other words, instead of public police, it relied upon private gatekeepers. A legal framework including legislation, rules and court decisions supported this system. This legal structure depended upon corporate managers, counterparties, “sophisticated investors” and the market generally to prevent irrational conduct.

The hands-off approach was premised upon a series of beliefs or expectations. The first was that corporate managers would not sacrifice long-term shareholder value for short-term gains. The second was that trading counterparties would monitor each other closely and discourage excessive risk. The third was that “sophisticated investors” had the ability to select and monitor “private” unregulated investment options and that such decisions affected the direct owners, not underlying investors and market integrity. And, the catch-all fourth belief was that even if there were blips and bubbles, the market would quickly “heal itself” before causing any major disruption or harm to society.

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Date posted: September 12, 2009 ; Last revised: December 23, 2013

Suggested Citation

Taub, Jennifer, Enablers of Exuberance: Legal Acts and Omissions that Facilitated the Global Financial Crisis (September 4, 2009). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1472190 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1472190

Contact Information

Jennifer Taub (Contact Author)
Vermont Law School ( email )
68 North Windsor Street
P.O. Box 60
South Royalton, VT 05068
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